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SUBJECT TO UNCERTAINTY: A CASE 





In June of 2017, the Supreme Court of Texas delivered an opinion in 
which they appeared to depart from long-standing rules of construction 
regarding the interpretation of deeds. The case was Wenske v. Ealy, in 
which the court set out to address a dispute that arose from a warranty deed 
conveying a mineral estate.
1
 The dispute dealt with the reservation of a 
mineral interest and the proper delegation of the burden of an existing 
royalty exception, or non-participating royalty interest (“NPRI”).
2
 The 
question came down to whether the language of the deed expressed an 
intent for the grantee to take the property subject to the entire burden of the 
NPRI, or if the exception was to be proportionately shared by both the 
grantor and grantee. In the end, the court was extremely divided in its five 
to four decision in which the majority held the intent of the parties did not 
expressly and clearly subject the granted interest to the entire burden of the 
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 Alternatively, the dissenting justices were of the opinion the parties 
were clear in stating what was subject to what.
4
 They opined that the entire 
burden of the NPRI should be borne by the grantee.
5
  
This case note examines how the majority opinion in Wenske v. Ealy 
establishes dangerous precedent regarding disputes surrounding the 
interpretation of mineral conveyances. Part two of this note discusses the 
law before the case. More specifically, it provides a refresher on some of 
the legal principals used in mineral conveyances, as well as methods of 
contract interpretation. Additionally, this section includes a summary of 
noted precedent in the case, how those decisions interpreted mineral deeds, 
and how they were decided. Part three of the note will address the case at 
hand, the background, a more specific expression of the issue, and a 
summary of both the majority and dissenting opinions. Lastly, part four 
analyzes this case and the effect that it will have on past and future mineral 
deeds.  
II. Law Before the Case 
A. A Refresher of Non-Participating Royalty Interest 
The details and attributes of various oil and gas interests can be rather 
convoluted. The issue here deals with the treatment of an NPRI. A mineral 
estate contains five rights that may be severed: the right to develop, the 
executory right, the right to receive royalties, the right to receive bonus 
payments, and the right to receive delay rentals.
6
 An NPRI is a royalty 
interest in the mineral estate that is non-possessory; the only right that is 
granted to an NPRI owner is the right to receive royalty payments.
7
 The 
NPRI differs from the standard royalty interest in that the owner of the 
NPRI does not own the right to produce the minerals, rather the NPRI 
owner is entitled to receive a share of gross production.
8
 This share of gross 
production is typically determined by a fixed royalty retained or granted in 
the deed.
9
 Additionally, in regards to the other standard lease benefits, the 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Id. at 798.  
 4. Id. at 800.  
 5. Id.  
 6. French v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 896 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. 1995).  
 7. KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 75 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Lee Jones, 
Jr., Non-Participating Royalty, 26 TEX. L. REV. 569, 569 (1948)). 
 8. Id.; see also 1 ERNEST E. SMITH AND JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL 
AND GAS § 2.4 (2017). 
 9. Id. 
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NPRI owner is not entitled to benefits, like delay rentals or bonuses, unless 




B. Unambiguous Contract Interpretation in Mineral Deeds 
A primary rule in contract interpretation was put forth in French v. 
Chevron, which stated, “If the language is unambiguous, the court’s 
primary duty is to ascertain the intent of the parties from the language of the 
deed by using the ‘four corners’ rule.”
11
 This intent canon is often aided by 
the combination of the four corners rule to interpret the contract, as French 
suggested.
12
 Typically, most courts examine the parties’ intent by 
examining the express language used in the instrument.
13
 Although a little 
harsh, but maybe an accurate idea as a result of this case, a variation of the 
intent canon may even suggest mineral deeds must be construed only from 
the language of that deed; suggesting any prior case law interpreting other 
mineral deeds is probably irrelevant.
14
  
The four corners rules mandates the court must review the entire 
document in an effort to determine the parties’ intent.
15
 Essentially, it 
encourages the reader to review the entire document and harmonize all 
parts, thereby aiding in the interpretation of the intent of the parties.
16
 The 
four corners rule requires the court to look to what is contained entirely 
within the four corners of the document, not individual terms, phrases, or 
clauses, to accurately determine the parties’ intent.
17
 As one court put it, 
when “determining the legal effect of a deed, whether as to grant, 
exception, reservation, consideration, or other feature, the inquiry is not to 
be determined alone from a single word, clause, or part but from every 
word, clause, and part that is pertinent.”
18
  
                                                                                                                 
 10. Id. 
 11. 896 S.W.2d at 796 (citing Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 495, 461 (Tex. 1991)). 
 12. Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds and Leases: 
An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 45 (1993). 
 13. Id. at 47. 
 14. Id at 49 (citing Kokernot v. Caldwell, 231 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) 
(writ ref'd)).  
 15. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 495, 461 (Tex. 1991). 
 16. Kramer, supra note 12, at 66. 
 17. Id. at 68.  
 18. Id. at 71-72 (quoting Reynolds v. McMan Oil & Gas Co., 11 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Tex. 
Comm'n App. 1928). 
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Harmonization is often paired or combined with the four corners rule.
19
 
One way to think of harmonization, as it relates to the four corners rule, is 
that a court should begin by attempting to give effect to all provisions of the 
document.
20
 If some of those provisions seem to conflict with each other, 
the court should then attempt to construe the conflicting provisions to avoid 
any conflicts. This should be done carefully by accounting for the parties’ 
intent as evidenced by the overall language of the document.
21
 Lastly, the 
court may be forced to anti-harmonize when doubt still exists regarding the 
proper construction of the deed.
22
  
In the oil and gas field, parties who draft agreements have long, and 
reasonably, relied on a court’s rule of interpretation when deciding how to 
express their intent.
23
 Therefore, the courts are typically careful to change 
long-standing rules when doing so may change the ownership of minerals 
that have been conveyed in various deeds and other instruments by relying 
on the understood law previously set by the court.
24
 Although, it does 
happen, as evidenced here in Wenske v. Ealy.  
C. The Subject-To Clause 
Generally, a subject-to clause is used when land or an interest in land is 
being conveyed while there is already an oil and gas lease outstanding.
25
 
Therefore, the interest is conveyed subject to any existing lease and other 
possible interests in the chain of title.
26
 Historically, the subject-to clause 
has not provided a reservation, but merely a recognition of outstanding 
interests in the chain of title.
27
 This is meant to protect the grantor from an 




However, in practice, the use of the subject-to clause has been expanded 
and is often used for other purposes, which tends to lead to intervention by 
the courts. Even the majority in the case in question notes that “subject-to” 
clauses are used for various purposes beyond their original intent.
29
 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. at 72. 
 20. Id. at 77. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 803 (Tex. 2017). 
 24. Averyt v. Grande, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 891, 895 (Tex. 1986). 
 25. Wright v. E.P. Operating Ltd. P’ship, 978 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. App. 1998). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Kokernot v. Caldwell, 231 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). 
 29. Wenske, 521 S.W. 3d at 796.  
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D. Interpretation in Noted Precedent 
The majority and dissenting opinions offered a few notable Texas cases 
that should be considered in analyzing the intent of the parties when 
reviewing this case. Although the majority essentially dismissed the use of 
these cases in the application of the rule, the dissent notes the similarities 
between these past cases and the case at issue which can, and should have 
been, used for the analytical approach taken to the specific facts.  
1. Bass v. Harper 
First, and discussed in depth in both opinions, is Bass v. Harper, a 
dispute also arising from the conveyance of oil and gas royalties.
30
 
Specifically, Bass, the grantor, owned the surface estate and 8/14ths of a 
1/8th royalty interest from an existing lease.
31
 The remaining 6/14ths were 
properly reserved by prior owners and not separately in dispute.
32
 Bass 
claimed he granted a half interest, or 7/14ths, to Miller, but the grant was 
subject to the existing 6/14ths royalty.
33
 Therefore, Bass essentially only 
granted a 1/14th royalty interest. Essentially, the granting instrument 
conveyed an undivided one-half interest in the tract but was subject to the 
prior mineral reservations totaling 8/14ths.
34
 Miller then conveyed, through 
a mineral deed, an undivided one-half interest in the oil, gas, and other 
minerals under the tract to the defendant, Harper.
35
 Additionally, the Millers 
re-conveyed to Bass the surface estate.
36
 Harper argued that Bass intended 
to convey a one-half interest in that which he currently owned, 4/14ths, to 
Miller.
37
 The court held that “under the specific wording of the instrument, 
Bass granted and conveyed to Miller an undivided one-half (7/14ths) of the 
1/8th royalty, and that the one-half interest granted (7/14ths) was subject to 
the outstanding 6/14ths royalty.”
38
 Therefore, Bass conveyed 1/14th of the 
royalty interest, not 4/14ths.
39
 Reviewing the intent of the parties and the 
plain language of the instrument, the court noted the only thing “subject to” 
                                                                                                                 
 30. 441 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1969). 
 31. Id. at 825. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 826. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 825. 
 38. Id. at 827. 
 39. Id. 
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anything was the grant conveying a one-half interest in the land to Miller.
40
 
What the grant was subject to was “‘the mineral reservations’ (6/14ths) 
contained in the deed[ ].”
41
 Notable was the court’s notion the only thing 
“subject to” anything was “the grant itself.” 
2. Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co. 
It may also be important to address Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber 
Company and the resulting Duhig Rule. Although not as important in this 
case, it is vital to the courts when there are issues in allocating royalties 
when there is an overconveyance in the warranty deed.
42
 The rule should be 
viewed as a rule of law rather than a rule of construction and is based on a 
theory of breach of warranty and estoppel by deed.
43
 In Duhig v. Peavy-
Moore Lumber Company, the Supreme Court of Texas established a grantor 
cannot grant and reserve the same interest, so if the grantor does not own a 
large enough interest to satisfy both the grant and the reservation, the grant 
must be satisfied first based upon breach of warranty and estoppel by 
deed.
44
 If there is an interest remaining after the grant is satisfied, that 
remaining interest may be used to satisfy the reservation.
45
 The rule was the 
result of a conveyance of property to W.J. Duhig in which the grantor 
reserved an undivided one-half interest in the minerals.
46
 Later, Duhig 
conveyed the property in a deed which retained an undivided one-half 
interest in the minerals.
47
 The issue was whether Duhig only reserved the 
one-half interest that was reserved in the grant, or if he reserved the 
remaining one-half interest that was remaining after he received the 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. See generally, Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940). 
 43. Joseph Shade, Petroleum Land Titles: Title Examination & Title Opinions, 46 
BAYLOR L. REV. 1007, 1043 (1994). 
 44. Acoma Oil Corp. v. Wilson, 471 N.W.2d 476, 480 (N.D. 1991); Joseph Shade, 
Petroleum Land Titles: Title Examination & Title Opinions, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 1007, 1043-
1044 (“Where a grantor conveys an interest in the minerals and in the same instrument 
reserves a mineral interest, and where there is a prior interest outstanding that is not excepted 
from the operation of the deed, so that effect may not be given to both the interest that 
grantor has purported to convey and the interest grantor has attempted to reserve, under the 
rule of Duhig v. Peavey-Moore Lumber Co., the grantee is not limited to a suit in damages 
for failure of title, but the attempted reservation will fail to the extent necessary to make the 
grantee whole. Where complete failure of the reserved interest is insufficient to make the 
grantee whole, he will also have a cause of action in damages for failure of title.”). 
 45. See id.  
 46. Duhig, 144 S.W.2d at 878. 
 47. Id. 
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 The court analyzed the problem by looking at what the granting 
clause actually conveyed.
49
 After that was established, the court looked at 
what was retained in the deed and what, if any, affect it had on the 
diminution of what was granted.
50
 In the end, the court held Duhig’s deed 
only accounted for the original one-half interest that was retained when the 
property was granted to Duhig, and did not reserve the remaining one-half 
interest for Duhig when he granted the property to the grantee.
51
 However, 
the important part in this case is not the specific holding, but the court’s 
methodological approach in determining what the language of the deed 
actually conveyed and the rule established for doing so.
52
 Essentially, 
Duhig established that when full effect cannot be given to both the granted 
interest and the reservation, the courts should give priority to the granted 
interest and the reservation will get what is left, if anything at all. 
The dissent in Wenske v. Ealy noted Duhig because of this methodical 
approach used in construing the questioned deed.
53
 The dissent praised the 
fact the Duhig court started by focusing on what was actually conveyed by 
the granting clause, and since it “identified the property itself, it conveyed 
all interest in the property even though the grantor did not own all the 
interest.”
54
 Because of that determination, the Duhig court set out to 
determine whether, and if so how, the retained clause diminished the 
grant.
55
 The dissent noted in the case at hand, what was conveyed by the 
granting clause must be determined, and then determine whether the 
subject-to clause diminished the grant.
56
 
3. Benge v. Scharbauer 
In Benge v. Scharbauer, the grantor attempted to convey the surface and 
5/8ths of the mineral in the land while reserving for themselves a 3/8ths 
mineral interest.
57
 However, a prior deed reserved a 1/4th mineral interest, 
and the grant to Benge did not except this prior interest.
58
 Therefore, the 
deed granted and reserved a full interest without taking into account the 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id. at 878-79. 
 49. Id. at 879. 
 50. Id. at 879-80. 
 51. Id. at 880. 
 52. Wenske, 521 S.W.2d at 808. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 259 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex. 1953). 
 58. Id. 
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1/4th mineral interest that was previously reserved. Thus, the court had to 
determine from which interest the 1/4th mineral interest was to be carved. 
Using Duhig, the court held the deed granted the grantee the surface and 
5/8ths of the mineral estate and that the grantor only reserved, because of 
the previously reserved 1/4th mineral interest and subsequent breach of the 
warranty, a 1/8th mineral interest.
59
 What was different about this grant is 
that it contained a provision, separate from the mineral interest grant, that 
mandated the grantee pay the grantor payment of 3/8ths of all royalties, 
bonuses, and delay rentals.
60
 The court noted that had this additional 
provision been excluded from the instrument, the royalties, bonus 
payments, and delay rentals would have been split according to the grant 
post Duhig application by the court, 1/8th to the grantor and 5/8ths to the 
grantee.
61
 The parties’ intent was examined, and it was decided that 
although the fractional part of royalties, bonuses, and delay rentals one is 
usually entitled to is the same as the mineral interest he owns, if the parties 
express, in a plain and formal way, an alternate intention, they may make 
the fractional division of mineral interest compared to the royalties, 
bonuses, and delay rentals different.
62
 
4. Pich v. Lankford 
Pich v. Lankford presents a similar issue from a series of conveyances 
and reservations between numerous parties concerning a 160-acre tract of 
land.
63
 Simply put, an individual, Howard, owned all the surface and 
minerals but only 1/4th of the royalties.
64
 Additionally, Pich owned a one-
half royalty interest and Fuehr owned the last 1/4th of the royalty interest.
65
 
Howard later conveyed the land to Sharp “Save and Except” an undivided 
3/4ths of the minerals.
66
 However, 3/4th of the minerals had not previously 
been reserved, just 3/4ths of the royalties.
67
 Sharp then conveyed the 
property to Lankford “Save and Except” an undivided 3/4th of the 
minerals.
68
 Eventually, Howard quitclaimed to Pich any interest they had in 
the 3/4th of the minerals “excepted and reserved” in their deed to the 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 168-69. 
 62. Id. at 169 
 63. 302 S.W.2d 645, 646 (Tex. 1957). 
 64. Id.; see also Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 809. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 646-47. 
 68. Id. at 646-47. 
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Lankford sued Pich and Fuehr, alleging the reservations Pich claimed 
were illegal and constituted a cloud on their title and should be canceled.
71
 
Additionally, they claimed the exceptions from Howard and Sharp did not 
reserve any interest in their deeds and, therefore, conveyed nothing to 
Pich.
72
 The court reviewed what the effect of the language was in the deeds 
by the Howards to the Sharps and by the Sharps to Lankford.
73
 In reviewing 
the plain language of the deed, the court noted the deeds clearly excepted a 
3/4th mineral interest and the deeds could not be interpreted to deal with a 
royalty interest based on the language used.
74
 Therefore, a 3/4ths mineral 
interest never passed to Lankford.
75
 The court explained that Pich acquired 
from Howard whatever right and interest they then owned and the language 
from the deed from Howard to Sharp did not reserve an interest in the 
minerals, it only excepted them from the grant.
76
 Consequently, since the 
interest did not pass and was not outstanding, the effect of the language was 
to leave it with Howard. As a result of the interpretations of the grants, the 
court held that Pich owned 3/4th of the minerals and one-half of the 
royalties; Lankford owned 1/4th of the minerals, 1/4th of the royalties, and 
the surface estate; and Fuehr owned 1/4th of the royalty interest.
77
 
Normally, Fuehr’s interest would have been carved out proportionally from 




The dissent in Wenske v. Ealy noted the methodical approach the Pich 
court took in its interpretation of the deeds.
79
 The dissent noted first how 
“the [c]ourt looked to see what interest the deed granted and then explained 
that an interest that is reserved or excepted is ‘excluded from the grant and 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. at 646-47. 
 70. Id. at 647. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 649. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 650. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. (“Ordinarily the royalty interest adjudged to [ ] Fuehr would be carved out 
proportionally from the two mineral ownerships, but [Pich] asserted in his appeal brief that it 
should be carved out entirely from the mineral interest adjudged to [Pich] . . . .”). 
 79. 521 S.W.3d at 811 (Boyd, J., dissenting). 
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does not pass to the grantee.’”
80
 Second the dissent noted how the Pich 
court explained that although not synonymous, both reservations and 
exceptions limit the interests from the granting clause.
81
 Lastly, the dissent 
praised the efforts of the Pich court for recognizing “that the parties’ 
agreement controls even when a royalty interest might otherwise 
correspond proportionally to multiple mineral interests.”
82
 
5. Selman v. Bristow 
Here, Bristow contends he was granted, through a warranty deed, 
ownership in a certain tract, except for a 1/8th royalty interest reserved by 
the grantor.
83
 Subsequently, Bristow conveyed the tract to Selman by a 
warranty deed and reserved for themselves a 1/4th mineral interest.
84
 
However, the conveyance from Bristow to Selman did not address the 1/8th 
royalty interest reserved by the original grantor.
85
 Therefore, the issue, and 
cause of disagreement, was how the burden of the 1/8th royalty interest was 
to be shared by the parties.
86
 Bristow contended the 1/8th royalty interest 
must be proportionately shared, meaning since Selman owned 3/4ths of the 
mineral estate and Bristow owned 1/4th of the mineral estate, Selman 
should be burdened by 3/4ths of the 1/8th royalty interest and Bristow 
burdened by 1/4th of the 1/8th royalty interest.
87
 Selman, of course, 
disagreed with this approach and instead argued all of the 1/8th royalty 
interest should burden Bristow out of their 1/4th reservation and the interest 
conveyed to them was unencumbered by the 1/8th royalty interest.
88
 
Therefore, the court had to determine which interest was actually conveyed 
by the deed from Bristow to Selman.
89
 The court rejected the notion the 
1/8th royalty interest must be shared proportionately by both of the mineral 
interest owners in this case.
90
 The deed conveyed to Selman “an absolute 
fee simple title to all interest in the land except a 1/4th interest in the 
minerals.”
91
 The court noted that to accept the idea the deed granted 3/4th 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. (quoting Pich, 302 S.W.2d at 650).  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Selman v Bristow, 402 S.W.2d. 520, 521 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). 
 84. Id. at 521-22. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 522. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 523.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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of the mineral interest subject to a proportionate reduction of the reserved 
royalty interest would be contrary to the actual language of the grant 
because “without the reservation clause, the deed clearly implies a grant of 
all of the surface and a full 3/4ths of the mineral estate.”
92
  
III. Statement Of The Case 
A. Facts 
The issue in Wenske v. Ealy dates back to 1988, when Benedict and 
Elizabeth Wenske purchased a fifty-five acre mineral estate from numerous 
parties, including Marian Vyvjala and Margie Novak.
93
 As a part of this 
transaction, Vyvjala and Novak each reserved a 1/8th non-participating 
royalty interest (“NPRI”), amounting to a combined 1/4th NPRI.
94
 The 
NPRI covered oil, gas, and any other minerals that may be present, and was 
active for twenty-five years from the date of the Wenskes’ purchase of the 
interest.
95
 Many years later, in 2003, and after no apparent issues, the 
Wenskes initiated a sale of the property to Steve and Deborah Ealy via a 
warranty deed.
96
 Supposedly, the warranty deed granted the entire surface 
estate to the Ealys and effectively split the mineral estate between the 
parties.
97
 The Wenskes reserved a 3/8ths interest in the mineral estate and 
conveyed the remaining 5/8ths to the Ealys.
98
 The pertinent language from 
the 2003 deed provides the following: 
Reservations from Conveyance:  
For Grantor and Grantor’s heirs, successors, and assigns forever, 
a reservation of an undivided 3/8ths of all oil, gas, and other 
minerals in and under and that may be produced from the 
Property. If the mineral estate is subject to existing production or 
an existing lease, the production, the lease, and the benefits from 
it are allocated in proportion to ownership in the mineral estate. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 92. Id. 
 93. 521 S.W.3d at 793. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.  
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Exceptions to Conveyance and Warranty: 
. . .  
Undivided one-fourth (1/4) interest in all of the oil, gas and other 
minerals in and under the herein described property, reserved by 
Marian Vyvjala, et al for a term of twenty-five (25) years in 
instrument recorded in Volume 400, Page 590 of the Deed 
Records of Lavaca County, Texas, together with all rights, 
express or implied, in and to the property herein described 
arising out of or connected with said interest and reservation, 
reference to which instrument is here made for all purposes.  
. . .  
Grantor, for the Consideration and subject to the Reservations 
from Conveyance and the Exceptions to Conveyance and 
Warranty, grants, sells, and conveys to Grantee the Property, 
together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances 
thereto in any way belonging, to have and to hold it to Grantee 
and Grantee's heirs, successors, and assigns forever. Grantor 
binds Grantor and Grantor's heirs and successors to warrant and 
forever defend all and singular the Property to Grantee . . . 
except as to the Reservations from Conveyance and the 
Exceptions to Conveyance and Warranty.
99
  
Eventually, in 2011, the Wenskes and Ealys obtained an oil and gas lease 
on the mineral estate.
100
 This oil and gas lease granted the parties a royalty 
on production based upon their proportional share of the interests.
101
 Soon 
thereafter, in 2013, the parties began to dispute as to whose share of the 
royalties, the Wenskes’ 3/8th or the Ealys’ 5/8th, the 1/4th NPRI would be 
deducted and distributed.
102
 The Wenskes believed their 3/8th mineral 
estate was unburdened by the NPRI due to the “subject-to” clause in the 
warranty deed thereby making the Ealys’ interest “subject to the 1/4th 
royalty interest.”
103
 They believed the full burden of the NPRI was 
transferred to the Ealys’ 5/8th interest through the deed.
104
 However, the 
Ealys believed that not only was their 5/8th interest burdened by the NPRI, 
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but that the Wenskes’ 3/8th interest was also burdened by the NPRI.
105
 The 
Ealys argued the 1/4th NPRI should be proportionately shared between 




The court set out to determine whether the language of the warranty deed 
between the Wenskes and the Ealys passed the entire NPRI burden 
proportionately across the parties or if the Ealys’ interest was the only 
interest burdened by the 1/4th NPRI.
107
 Essentially, the court set out to 
determine how the remaining 3/4ths royalty interest was allocated between 
the Wenskes and the Ealys.   
C. Holding 
After analysis, the court held for the Ealys in finding both their and the 
Wenskes mineral interest were burdened by the 1/4th NPRI.
108
 The court 
felt the only reasonably interpretation of the deed led to the conclusion that 
both the Wenskes and Ealys bore the burden of the NPRI depending on 
their proportionate interests.
109
 The court held the deed granted 5/8ths of the 
mineral interest to the Ealys, reserved 3/8ths for the Wenskes, and put the 
Ealys on notice that the entire mineral estate, both the Wenskes’ and the 
Ealys’ interests, were subject to the 1/4th NPRI.
110
 Rationalized by 
claiming to give “the words of [the] deed their plain meaning, reading it in 
its entirety, and harmonizing all of its parts . . .,” the court felt it could not 
place the entire NPRI burden on the Ealys’ interest.
111
 
D. Decision of the Case 
In the court’s analysis, the court claimed it was “reinforce[ing] a trend in 
[its] mineral-deed jurisprudence,” supposedly casting off “rigid, mechanical 
rules of deed construction” as “relics of a bygone era” by “ascertain[ing] 
the parties’ intent by careful examination of the entire deed.”
112
 The court 
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 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
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based its analysis upon effectuating the parties’ intent, determined by a 
careful and detailed review of the deed in its entirety.
113
 
The court began by noting that neither the Wenskes nor the Ealys 
believed their warranty deed was ambiguous; therefore, the court felt the 
majority, if not all, of its analysis hinged on the actual language in the deed 
and the intent underlying that language.
114
  
In the bulk of its analysis, the court directly dealt with the language of 
the deed, determined to discover the true intent of the parties as expressed 
within the four corners of the document.
115
 The court expressly dismissed 
the reasoning of the appellate court’s use of any arbitrary rules, noting, 
“The parties’ intent, when ascertainable, prevails over arbitrary rules. And 
we can ascertain the parties’ intent here by careful examination of the entire 
deed.”
116
 The court recognized the construction of the deed in this case 
hinged on the parties’ use of the subject-to clause, “the precise effect of 
[the] conveyance being ‘subject to the Reservations from Conveyance and 
the Exceptions to Conveyance and Warranty’ in the deed.”
117
 The court 
concluded the interest granted to the Ealys was very much in fact burdened 
by the NPRI, but could not find that it did not also burden the Wenskes’ 
reserved interest.
118
 Urging against the isolation of certain words or phrases, 
the court felt the entire context of the language should be taken into 
account, or harmonized, when determining intent.
119
 The use of 
“mechanical rules” or “magic words” was completely dismissed by the 
court when determining intent.
120
  
Typically, a principal of oil and gas law dictates that under a conveyance 
of mineral interest, the nature of that interest includes the right to receive 
the corresponding interest in the royalty.
121
 The court noted that along the 
same lines, the NPRI, generally, would burden the entire mineral estate as it 
limits the royalty interest attached to the mineral interest.
122
 However, the 
court dismissed the idea that the foregoing principal truly made a difference 
in this case.
123
 Instead, the court recognized that parties to a contract are 
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able to allocate the division of interest in any manner they wish, and these 
wishes should, if expressly made in the deed, control the outcome of 
interpretation.
124
 However, if the parties want their deed to stray from the 
generally accepted principals of oil and gas law and mineral conveyances, 
the court stated, “they should ‘plainly and in a formal way express that 
intention.’”
125
 The court felt there were no such intentions made in the 
warranty deed that convey part of the mineral interest from the Wenskes to 
the Ealys.
126
 Instead, the court concluded that the combined exceptions to 
conveyance and exceptions to warranty, read with the subject-to clause, 
only indicated an intent to avoid a breach of warranty, not an attempt to 
reserve a 3/8th mineral interest unburdened by the existing NPRI.
127
 The 
court held the warranty deed between the Wenskes and the Ealys could not 
reasonably be read as conveying the entire burden of the NPRI to Ealys 
5/8ths interest.  
The court anticipated confusion and wanted to make clear that not all 
conveyances of fractional mineral interest burdened by an NPRI would 
result in a proportionate share burdening all the fractional mineral interest 
owners. Instead, the court believed its opinion was just the opposite, 
requiring that in an interpretation of “an unambiguous deed, the parties’ 
intent–determined by a careful and detailed examination of the document in 
its entirety–is paramount.”
128
 The court added, “Rigid, mechanical, 
arbitrary, and arcane rules, which at one time offered certainty at the 
expense of effectuating intent, are relics of a bygone era.”
129
 The court 
acknowledged the awareness that those who drafted agreements relied on 
the court for principals, definitions, continuity, and predictability, especially 
in regards to oil and gas law.
130
 However, the court believed that nothing 
expressed in its opinion challenged existing principals of oil and gas law 
nor opened up for debate the meaning of clearly defined terms in deed 
disputes.
131
 Instead, the court believed the interpretation based upon intent 
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E. Dissent  
The dissent agreed that the parties’ intent was necessary in construing the 
deed. However, they disagreed on how the majority arrived at their 
conclusion and the precedent apparently ignored in doing so.
133
 The dissent 
agreed with the majority in that the court must rely on the deed’s plain 
language in order to determine the parties’ intent, but they concluded the 
plain language expressly stated the only interest subject to the NPRI was 
the Ealys’ interest.
134
 The dissent stated, “The deed’s plain language does 
not subject the Wenskes’ mineral interest to anything.”
135
 The dissent 
claims that while the majority analyzed the typical meaning of “subject-to,” 
they failed to consider, under this particular deed, what was subject to 
what.
136
 The dissent felt this was the controlling question in the case and 
that it was completely ignored and left unaddressed by the majority; so, as a 
result, they reached the wrong conclusion in this case.
137
 
The dissent analyzed the issue by first determining what was actually 
subject to anything.
138
 The dissent felt the deed’s granting clause 
unambiguously identified “that which is ‘subject to’ something is the 
interest granted, sold, and conveyed to the Ealys.”
139
  Deeply dissecting the 
language of the deed, the dissent felt the deed was clear in that the 
conveyance is “subject to” the “Reservation from Conveyance” and the 
“Exception to Conveyance and Warranty.”
140
 They felt the grant included 
all the surface and mineral interests to the Ealys, but their interest was 
“subject to” the reservations and exceptions.
141
 One of those reservations 
being the Wenskes’ 3/8ths interest and the exception being the 1/4th 
NPRI.
142
 The dissent felt the deed only described one interest that was 
“subject to” anything, that being the interest the Wenskes conveyed to the 
Ealys.
143
 The dissent believed that the plain language of the deed did not 
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Next, the dissent set out to determine what the Ealys’ interest was 
“subject to.” The dissent noted that although, as they felt, the granting 
clause purported to convey all of the interest in the property to the Ealys, 
that was not actually possible due to the NPRI.
145
 This was one of the 
reasons for the subject-to clause.
146
 The other of which being the Wenskes’ 
wish to keep a 3/8ths interest in the mineral estate.
147
 The dissent felt the 
deed unambiguously provided for a grant subject to any reservations and 
exceptions, those of which being the 3/8ths reservation in the mineral estate 
by the Wenskes and the previous exception of a 1/4th NPRI. Therefore, the 
granting clause subjected the Ealys’ interest to the reservation and 
exception.
148
 The dissent interprets and reads the deed’s language 
subjecting the Ealys’ interest to the 1/4th NPRI, not 3/8ths of the 1/4th 
NPRI.
149
 The dissent insisted that “just as the deed subjects the Ealys’ 
interest to all of the Wenskes’ 3/8ths mineral interest, it also subjects the 
Ealys’ interest to all of [the] 1/4th interest in the royalties.”
150
 The dissent 
concluded the plain language suggested only that the Ealys’ interest was 
subject to the 1/4th NPRI.
151
 
The dissent felt the majority opinion would create mass uncertainty in 
the law because the principals and precedent that support the deed’s plain 
language were not relied upon.
152
 Noting basic concepts of mineral estates 
interests, the dissent noted that a severed royalty interest would typically 
burden the entire mineral estate because it limits the royalty interest that 
attaches to the underlying mineral interest and this royalty interest would be 
carved out proportionately from the multiple mineral ownerships, if there 
were more than one.
153
 However, even though a severed fractional royalty 
interest will typically burden the entire mineral estate, the parties may 
contract around the norm by expressing intentions “plainly and in a formal 
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 146. Id. 
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 148. Id. at 803. 
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way” to alter the burden.
154
 The dissent felt as though that is exactly what 
the Wenskes did by granting all of the property to the Ealys, but making 
that interest subject to their reservation and the NPRI exception.
155
  
The dissent then went into the precedent noted above, apparently 
dismissed by the majority, and compared the methodical approaches used to 
the present case.
156
 The dissent believed that each of those cases used an 
approach similar to the one presented as an alternate to the majority and 
supported the dissenting view that the Wenskes expressed an intent to make 




In the end, the dissent felt the plain language of the deed supported a 
finding that the interest granted to the Ealys was subject to the entire burden 
of the NPRI, not just a proportional share.
158
 They felt that “the inherent 




IV. Analysis  
The five-to-four decision of the court in this case goes to show the 
divisiveness of the justices in the majority’s holding. Even though both the 
majority and the dissent based their conclusions, in effect, off the same 
concept of interpreting the deed via its plain language and the intent of the 
parties, per the four corners rule, they came to drastically different end 
results. It seems as if one side must have read more into the words than 
should have been, or the other side dismissed more than was appropriate. It 
seems to be the latter of the two, which in this case, was the majority 
opinion. Consequently, the majority has disrupted long standing rules for 
interpreting mineral conveyances, disregarding the language in the deed, 
principals of the interests, and years of precedent. 
The majority certainly was on the right track by attempting to use the 
plain language of the warranty deed and the parties’ intent in its 
interpretation; however, they seemed to have come up short in analyzing 
each and every word contained therein. The dissent’s main focus was to 
determine what was subject to what via a methodical approach.
160
 The 
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 155. Id.  
 156. Id. at 807. 
 157. See generally id. at 807-17. 
 158. Id. at 816. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. at 801-02.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss1/6
2018]  A Case of Ignored Intent — Wenske v. Ealy 97 
 
 
failure of the majority to address what was really stated and meant in the 
deed resulted in thereby failing to answer what was subject to what. Just 
because the granting clause did not say explicitly that the grantees should 
be solely burdened by the NPRI, does not mean that is not what was 
intended by the parties.  
Uncertainty will unfortunately result regarding the proper construction of 
a deed and how to properly retain an interest that is unburdened by an 
existing exception. The court has created doubt and uneasiness in the proper 
construction of these deeds, the granting clauses, and the subject-to clauses. 
Although the use of a subject-to clause to assign the burden of an NPRI in a 
warranty deed may not always have been the best and most clear way to 
shift the burden, it has long been used for that purpose. Intent in an 
agreement may not always be as easy to express as a court later determines 
it should have been. There are decades worth of agreements, deeds, and 
court cases that attest to that difficulty. The court here has, in effect, made 
the process of doing just that impeccably harder. The majority has ignored a 
mass amount of the language contained in the Wenskes’ warranty deed and 
instead took a shortcut, by unduly wanting more expression in the granting 
and subject-to clause, to incorrectly determine the parties’ intent. The court 
seemed to bypass basic understanding of the granting clause. No longer is 
the ability to grant an interest in a mineral estate subject to reservations and 
exceptions as simple as the plain language seems to demonstrate. It seems 
the court now requires some unspecified language which more expressly 
burdens the grantee with previously existing exceptions in the chain of title. 
It is almost as if, in addition to including the long-used “subject-to” 
language, the majority seems to suggest more explicit, direct, and repetitive 
language that the grantee’s interest is the sole interest burdened by the 
existing NPRI is required. But this potential requirement is not really 
understood because the majority failed to establish a clear standard of what 
may have been required by the Wenskes or what may be required by future 
parties to accurately express intent.  
Additionally, the court has arguably changed a rule of interpretation that 
has long been relied upon by lower courts, practitioners, and drafters of 
agreements. That is not to say rules of interpretation should be relied upon 
as concrete, just that their existence in precedent has long guided parties 
while drafting instruments. Even the dissent agreed that no rigid rules 
should be used to interpret the intent of deeds, but noted that changing 
adopted rules of construction used in interpreting agreements will have a 
negative impact on drafters who reasonably rely on that rule when 
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attempting to express their intent.
161
 They even cited another Supreme 
Court of Texas oil and gas case in which the court opined it should “be 
loathe to change long-standing rules in the oil and gas field when doing so 
would alter the ownership of minerals conveyed in deeds which rely on the 
law established by this court and followed by lower courts, commentators, 
and especially lawyers advising their clients.”
162
 
A solution may have to turn on the idea of adding additional language, 
perhaps an additional clause, in conveyances that expressly describes the 
parties’ actual intentions. The intentions of the parties could be clearly 
written and, perhaps, even the expected and intended surface, mineral, and 
royalty interest fractions of every known party could be noted to aid in a 
possible court interpretation of parties’ intended interests. However, this 
seems a bit redundant when you really think about what is being done. It is 
as if the repeated formalities and legalese used in conveyances for decades 
is not sufficient in explaining what the parties intend to do. If this is the 
case, then why is this language used at all?  The standard and expected 
language used in these conveyances should be sufficient in portraying the 
parties’ use of the agreement.  However, this additional clause, if not added 
carefully, may purport to contradict the otherwise certain language 
contained in the rest of the document. This risk of potential added 
uncertainty could reverse the positive effects that were intended by its 
addition.  
Perhaps the biggest danger of this decision is not what effect it will have 
on the drafting of future grants, but what effects it will have on the decades 
worth of grants which have already been drafted. After this unexpected 
result from the court, drafters should be even more careful in drafting their 
conveyances. Intent should be clear and concise, without any room for 
alternate interpretation.  
V. Conclusion 
The majority opinion seemed to hinge on the fact that the deed granting 
the Ealys an interest in the property from the Wenskes did not explicitly 
state, and in exact language, that the NPRI would only burden the Ealys. 
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The majority failed to read deep enough into what the drafters wrote and 
what the deed was actually granting. By not carefully examining what was 
subject to what, as the dissent noted, the court has created the potential for 
mass uncertainty in an area of law that is complex and risky enough. 
Wenske v. Ealy presented an opportunity for the court to confirm how to 
effectively effectuate intent when there is an interest subject to another. 
Instead, the court seemed to ignore long standing rules of interpretations, 
subjecting drafters to confusion rather than clarity. Given the infancy of this 
decision, we will have to wait and see the level of impact it will have on 
conveyances. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that this decision will affect 
how courts and practitioners analyze conveyances for years to come. 
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